“Is Hegel’s Theory of Sensation Committed to Metaphysics? A Comparison between Hegel and McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge” (by F. Sanguinetti)

On the occasion of the release of the new volume of Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy (2015, Vol. XVIII), we are glad to recommend the article “Is Hegels’ Theory of Sensation Committed to Metaphysics? A Comparison Between Hegel and McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge”, by F. Sanguinetti.

The new volume of Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, entitled “Analytic Philosophy meets Classical German Philosophy”, is focused on the relation of Analytic Philosophy to Classical German Philosophy, with particular regard to Kant and Hegel. Among others, the volume includes some articles presented at the workshop held by the Ruhr-University Bochum in October, 2013 on the interaction between Analytic Philosophy and Classical German Philosophy; guest editors of the volume are A. Newen and B. Sandkaulen.

Below you can find the abstract of the paper:

The main aim of this paper is to analyse Hegel’s theory of cognitive reference to the world and, in particular, Hegel’s theory of sensation (Empfindung), in order to verify whether it implies metaphysical commitments (and, if so, to what extent). I will pursue my goal by investigating the problem of sensation in Hegel’s philosophy starting from McDowell’s conception of the relation between mind and world and from his theory of perception. In my view, this strategy offers a threefold advantage that will enable us to do the following: i) persuasively interpret the Hegelian theory of sensation; ii) better understand the authenticity and the limits of McDowell’s ‘Hegelianism’; iii) place the Hegelian theory of sensation within the complex contemporary debate on the status of sensible experience.



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