Edited by Luca Illetterati & Giovanna Miolli

THE RELEVANCE OF
HEGEL'S
CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

**From Classical German Philosophy
to Contemporary Metaphilosophy**

Also Available From Bloomsbury

The Relevance of Hegel's Concept of Philosophy

From Classical German Philosophy to Contemporary Metaphilosophy

Edited by
Luca Illetterati and Giovanna Miolli

Contents

Part 3 Hegel's Metaphilosophy in Context

Part 4 Hegel's Metaphilosophy and Contemporary Thought

Figures

Tables

Notes on Contributors

Michela Bordignon is a Professor at the Universidade Federal do ABC, Brazil, at the Centre of Natural and Human Sciences. Her research interests are in logic and metaphysics in classical German philosophy, especially on the relation between Hegel's logic and the contemporary debate on logic, metaphysics and epistemology. Her book on Hegel's notion of contradiction, *Ai limiti della verità. Il problema della contraddizione nella logica di Hegel*, was published in 2015.

Christophe Bouton is Full Professor of Philosophy at Bordeaux Montaigne University in the Department of Philosophy. His research interests are in Hegel's philosophy, theory of history and philosophy of time. Among his publications are *Temps et esprit dans la philosophie de Hegel. De Francfort à Iéna* (2000), *Le Procès de l'histoire. Fondements et postérité de l'idéalisme historique de Hegel* (2004), *Temps et liberté* (2007; English translation *Time and Freedom*, 2014), *Faire l'histoire* (2013) and *Le Temps de l'urgence* (2013).

Andrew Buchwalter is Presidential Professor at the University of North Florida. He has taught at Yale University and served as a Fulbright Guest Professor at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum. His research interests include German idealism, legal-political philosophy, critical social theory, global and environmental justice, human rights and public cultural policy. He is the author of *Dialectics, Politics, and the Contemporary Value of Hegel's Practical Philosophy* (2012) and the edited volumes *Hegel and Global Justice* (2012), *Hegel and Capitalism* (2015) and *Culture and Democracy: Social and Ethical Issues in Public Support for the Arts and Humanities* (1992).

Luca Corti is Assistant Professor at the University of Padua as well as a Marie-Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the University of Padua, University of Chicago and University Paris I Sorbonne. He has published two books and several articles on Kant, Hegel and contemporary Hegelisms, the philosophy of nature and Sellars and Sellarsian themes, including 'The Notion of Sensation in Sellars' Theory of Perception' (2021), 'Senses and Sensations: On Hegel's Later Picture of Perceptual Experience' (2018) and 'Conceptualism, Non-Conceptualism, and the Method of Hegel's Psychology' (2016). He is a co-editor of *Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy* (2018) and *Nature and Naturalism in Classical German Philosophy* (forthcoming).

Eleonora Cugini is an independent researcher in philosophy. She received her PhD from the University of Padua in 2019 with a dissertation on the notion of 'second nature' and its relationship to the notions of 'freedom' and 'Wirklichkeit' in Hegel's

philosophy. She has studied and worked at the Universities of Rome, Padua and Berlin. She is particularly interested in the problem of the relationships between norms, life, technology and the process of realization of freedom. Her research interests include classical German philosophy, Critical Theory, feminist philosophy and the philosophy of technique.

Dina Emundts is Professor of the History of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at Freie Universität Berlin. From 2011 to 2016, she was a professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Konstanz. She has published numerous essays and books on Kant and Hegel, has been editor of the International Yearbook of German Idealism together with Sally Sedgwick and has been the President of the Hegel Association since 2017. Her most recent book is *Erfahren und Erkennen* (2012).

Héctor Ferreiro is Senior Researcher at Argentina's National Scientific and Technical Research Council and Director of the Research Programme on Classical German Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina, Buenos Aires. His research interests are in German idealism – especially Kant and Hegel – and medieval and modern metaphysics. Among his recent publications are the edited volume (with Thomas Sören Hoffmann) *Metaphysik–Metaphysikkritik–Neubegründung der Erkenntnis. Der Ertrag der Denkbewegung von Kant bis Hegel* (2017) and the book *Siete ensayos sobre la muerte de la metafísica: Una introducción al idealismo absoluto a partir de la ontología* (2016).

Paul Giladi is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University and an honorary research fellow at the University of Sheffield. He has published articles in leading philosophy journals and edited collections on Hegel, pragmatism, critical social theory, feminism and contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Dr Giladi is also the editor of *Responses to Naturalism: Critical Perspectives from Idealism and Pragmatism* (2019), the editor of *Hegel and the Frankfurt School* (2020) and the co-editor (with Nicola McMillan) of *Epistemic Injustice and the Philosophy of Recognition* (forthcoming 2022).

Kevin J. Harrelson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Ball State University in Indiana, United States. He is the author of *The Ontological Argument from Descartes to Hegel* (2009) as well as articles in many areas of philosophy, including American idealism, the philosophy of language, race, empathy and narrative.

Dietmar H. Heidemann is Professor of Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Luxembourg. From 2006 to 2008, he was Professor of Philosophy at Hofstra University, New York. His work focuses on classical German philosophy, especially Kant and Hegel. He is the editor of the *Kant Yearbook* and a member of the Kant-Kommission of the Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Since 2019, he has been the First Chairman of the Kant-Gesellschaft. He is the author of *Der Begriff des Skeptizismus. Seine systematischen Formen, die pyrrhonische Skepsis und Hegels Herausforderung* (2007).

Luca Illetterati is Full Professor of Theoretical Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Applied Psychology at the University of Padua. He is the Coordinator of the International Research Group on Classical German Philosophy 'Hegel*pd*' (www.hegelpd.it) at the University of Padua and Editor-in-Chief of the philosophical journal *Verifiche*. He has published several articles on Hegel, Kant and Heidegger. He is the co-editor (with Paolo Giuspoli) of *Filosofia Classica Tedesca: le parole chiave* (2016), (with Francesca Michelini) of *Purposiveness: Teleology between Nature and Mind* (2008) and (with Francesca Menegoni) of *Wirklichkeit. Beiträge zu einem Schlüsselbegriff der Hegelschen Philosophie* (2018). His monographs include *La filosofia come esperienza del pensiero e scienza della libertà. Un approccio a Hegel* (2002) and (with Paolo Giuspoli and Gianluca Mendola) *Hegel* (2010).

Peter Jonkers is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. His research interests are in the history of modern philosophy (especially Hegel and Jacobi), the philosophy of religion, metaphysics and contemporary continental philosophy. In his current research, he handles questions regarding religious truth, tolerance, religious and cultural diversity and a philosophical exploration of wisdom. His most recent publications are *How to Break the Ill-Fated Bond between Religious Truth and Violence* and *Philosophy and Wisdom* (both 2020).

Zdravko Kobe is Professor of Classical German Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. He has published four books on Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy and numerous articles, especially on Kant, Hegel and contemporary philosophy. Recently, his research interest has been mainly Hegel's logic and political philosophy. He is also the Slovenian translator of classical philosophical texts, such as Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* and *Science of Logic*.

Paul A. Kottman is Professor of Comparative Literature at the New School for Social Research, New York. His main research interests include literary theory, aesthetics and Shakespeare. Most recently, he is the author of *Love as Human Freedom* (2017) and the co-editor (with Michael Squire) of *The Art of Hegel's Aesthetics: Hegelian Philosophy and the Perspectives of Art History* (2018).

Giulia La Rocca is a PhD candidate at the University of Ljubljana. Her doctoral research focuses on Hegel's philosophy of history. She is also conducting a research project on Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy that she has started in collaboration with the Universities of Jena and Padua. Her broader scientific interests include classical German philosophy, particularly Hegel and Kant, issues in the autonomy of thought and its historical dimension.

Giovanna Luciano completed a Dual Award Doctoral Program under the joint supervision of the University of Padua and Western Sydney University with the thesis 'Philosophical Labour: The Critical Role of Hegel's Logics'. She has been awarded a CAPES (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior)/Print postdoctoral fellowship at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, where

she is working on the link between the logical dimension and the concrete sphere of action in Hegel's philosophy. Her research interests are in classical German philosophy (especially Kant and Hegel) and contemporary Critical Theory.

Jamila M.H. Mascat is Assistant Professor in Gender and Postcolonial Studies in the Department of Media and Cultural Studies at Utrecht University, the Netherlands. Her research interests are in Hegel's philosophy and contemporary Hegelianism, Marxism, feminist theories and postcolonial critiques. She is the author of *Hegel a Jena. La critica dell'astrazione* (2011) and has co-edited *Femministe a parole* (2012), G.W.F. Hegel, *Il bisogno di filosofia: 1801–1804* (2014), M. Tronti, *Il demone della politica. Antologia di scritti: 1958–2015* (2017), *Hegel & sons. Filosofie del riconoscimento* (2019), *The Object of Comedy. Philosophies and Performances* (2019) and A. Kojève, *La France et l'avenir de l'Europe* (2021).

Thomas Meyer is Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at Humboldt University of Berlin. His research interests are Hegel and German idealism, action theory, the theory of causation, legal philosophy and metaethics. His most recent publication is *Verantwortung und Verursachung. Eine moral- und rechtsphilosophische Studie zu Hegel* (2020).

Francesca Menegoni is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Padua. Her books include *Moralità e morale in Hegel* (1982), *Soggetto e struttura dell'agire in Hegel* (1993), *Le ragioni della speranza* (2001), *Fede e religione in Kant* (2005), *La Critica del Giudizio di Kant* (2nd edition, 2008) and *Hegel* (2018). Her most recent publications also include 'Hat die Klassische Deutsche Philosophie auch heute noch eine Relevanz für die italienische Philosophie?' in *Geschichte Gesellschaft Geltung* (2016) and 'Handlungen und Tätigkeiten in Hegels Auffassung des objektiven und des absoluten Geistes' in *Objektiver und absoluter Geist nach Hegel* (2018).

Giovanna Miolli is a Marie-Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the University of Padua and Adjunct Professor of Philosophical Anthropology at the University of Genoa. She is a member of the International Research Group on Classical German Philosophy 'Hegel*pd*' in the Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Applied Psychology at the University of Padua. She has studied and carried out research projects at Humboldt University of Berlin and the Universities of Padua, Sydney and Münster. Her research interests include classical German philosophy (especially Hegel), theories of truth, contemporary metaphilosophy, feminist philosophies and the philosophy of education. She has published several articles and is the author of *Il pensiero della cosa. Wahrheit hegeliana e Identity Theory of Truth* (2016).

Johannes-Georg Schülein is Assistant Professor at the Chair and Research Centre for Classical German Philosophy / Hegel Archive at the University of Bochum, Germany. His research interests are in metaphysics and epistemology, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of culture. He has published on Hegel, Schelling, Kant, Heidegger and Derrida. His most recent book is *Metaphysik und ihre Kritik bei Hegel und Derrida* (2016).

Michael Quante is a Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Münster, where he also holds the Chair of Ethics and Practical Philosophy. Additionally, he is the Vice-Rector for Internationalization and Knowledge Transfer at the University of Münster. His research interests are in German idealism, philosophy of the person, action theory, ethics, biomedical ethics, legal and social philosophy. His most recent publications have been *Spirit's Actuality* (2018) and *Pragmatistic Anthropology* (2018).

Sebastian Stein is a research associate at Heidelberg University sponsored by the German Research Foundation (DFG) for a project on the philosophical method. He has published several articles on Kant, post-Kantian idealism and Aristotle and has recently guest-edited and contributed to a special volume of the *Hegel Bulletin* on Hegel and Aristotle. Dr Stein is co-editor (with Thom Brooks) and contributor to the collection *Hegel's Practical Philosophy* (2017) and co-editor (with James Gledhill) and contributor to *Hegel and Contemporary Practical Philosophy* (2020). His chapter 'Hegel' features in the *Blackwell Guide to Nineteenth Century Philosophy*, and as an editor and contributor he has recently published two collections on Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* and has a collection forthcoming on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Olivier Tinland is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University Paul-Valéry of Montpellier, France. His research interests include nineteenth-century German philosophy, contemporary pragmatism and the history of relativism. He has published several books on Hegel, including *Lectures de Hegel* (2005), *Hegel* (2008) and *L'idéalisme hégélien* (2013).

Elena Tripaldi received her PhD from the University of Padua with the thesis, '"The Truth of Substance": Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics and His Ontology of Subjectivity'. She is a member of the Editorial Board of the academic blog www.hegelpd.it. Her research interests are in the relationship between logic and metaphysics in Hegel, Hegel's metaphysics and its possible connection with contemporary ontology, metaphysics and meta-metaphysics.

Konrad Utz is a Professor at the Federal University of Ceará (Universidade Federal do Ceará) in Fortaleza, Brazil. His research interests are in German idealism, Aristotle and his own philosophical project, 'philosophy of conditioned origination' (*Zufall* in German). He has published on Hegel, Kant, Aristotle and on his own philosophy. His most recent book is *Bewusstsein. Eine Philosophische Theorie* (2012).

Why Hegel's Metaphilosophy Matters:
An Introduction

Luca Illetterati and Giovanna Miolli

This volume is devoted to exploring Hegel's concept of philosophy, its relevance to current philosophical discussions and its possibility of productively interacting with other philosophical traditions. On this journey, comparisons with contemporary metaphilosophical thought are inevitable. Examining the nature of philosophy forms an essential part of philosophical theorizing today in an ongoing effort to understand (and reinvent) what this discipline *is* or *should be*.

For some decades now, we have witnessed a growing interest in Hegel's speculation and its critical, creative potential to inspire new philosophical positions. This renewed attention to Hegel's thought has usually been directed at specific parts of his philosophical production. Many scholars, for instance, have concentrated on the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, drawing on its potential to offer crucial insights into core issues of contemporary philosophical debate, such as self-consciousness, recognition and the sociality of reason, as well as its historicity and its characteristically inferential structure. Others have focused on distinct parts of Hegel's system, especially on the philosophy of right and the conception of normativity as well as on the philosophy of art, primarily elaborating on the idea of the so-called end of art. Recently, Hegel's logic has also attracted significantly greater interest, both in terms of its potential proximity to paraconsistent logics and its relation to metaphysics.

This focus on specific themes of Hegelian thought from a perspective that is not merely historical-reconstructive but deliberately places Hegel in a strong relationship with today's philosophical discussions implicitly presupposes a rediscovery of his distinctive way of understanding philosophical thinking and practice. However, a focused, extended treatment of Hegel's metaphilosophy – namely, of his conception of what philosophy is,[1] how it develops and how it relates to other disciplines and forms of human production – remains to be done.[2]

One reason for this absence might be the systematic structure of Hegel's philosophy itself. In the (not so recent but still provocative) article 'What Is Hegel's Legacy and What Should We Do with It?' (1999), Rolf-Peter Horstmann illustrated an aporetic situation that he thought characterized present-day Hegelian studies. According to to Horstmann, the contemporary interpreter of Hegel must deal with an illusory dilemma: either 'save' the parts of Hegel's speculation considered useful and topical,

thus renouncing the systematic whole, or opt for the latter, which risks facing some of Hegel's aspects, principles and convictions that could create serious embarrassment for contemporary readers.[3]

In the course of Horstmann's argument, this dilemma soon becomes a dead end. On the one hand, isolating certain aspects of Hegelian elaboration – mostly his sociopolitical thought but also parts of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the introductory reflections to the actual treatises – proves to be fundamentally incorrect, as these aspects are rooted in the very whole that has been discarded. They are what they are, and they show themselves according to the characteristics that Hegel attributes to them precisely because of the speculative totality that supports them, which is articulated according to specific ontological, methodological and epistemological directives. Extrapolating these parts because they are considered useful for the purposes of contemporary reflection is ill-advised, as it ignores (deliberately or not) that their meaning arises from the context in which Hegel inserted them. The underlying assumption of such a discourse is that one cannot consider one part of Hegelian speculation without thereby considering the entire system that has generated it. On the other hand, Horstmann argued that to embrace Hegel's philosophy as a whole and thus accept the ontological, methodological and epistemological claims that form its backbone is, for a contemporary philosopher, simply inadmissible.[4] It seems that wherever one wants to go, therefore, the way is precluded, particularly in attempts to update Hegelian philosophy.

The challenge of this volume is to take on the radical character of Hegel's conception of philosophy – together with its implication for all the aspects related to it (theoretical, historical, ethical, political and connected to art, religion and the sciences) – and explore how it 'reacts' to contemporary interrogation and vice versa. Beyond simply making Hegel topical, we mobilize aspects of his 'philosophy of philosophy' that may stimulate contemporary thought while also revealing its assumptions that go unquestioned. In this sense, the attempt to account for the relevance of Hegel's conception of philosophy also entails a critical dimension, capable of bringing to light the limits and idiosyncrasies of how philosophy is understood today.

To this end, this volume offers a wide-ranging account of Hegel's metaphilosophy from various angles, relating this material to other philosophical traditions and to present metaphilosophical debates. Hegel's reflections on the nature, scope, articulation, object and method of philosophy can fruitfully interact with contemporary metaphilosophical debates. Specifically, it can significantly contribute to much-discussed topics, such as the scientificity of philosophy and its relation to the natural, experimental sciences; the relation between philosophy and the history of philosophy; and the relation between the theoretical and practical dimensions of philosophy. Before expanding upon Hegel's contributions to present issues in metaphilosophical debates, however, a brief insight into the nature of metaphilosophy may be useful.

Metaphilosophy and the fate of philosophy

'Metaphilosophy' is a recent word for an ancient theoretical practice. At least from Plato's speculation onwards, philosophy has questioned its own 'nature', making it somewhat redundant today to emphasize this aspect (though it could be informative of

philosophy when compared with other disciplines).[5] Contrariwise, the need to isolate a specific name for philosophy's investigation of itself and to clearly circumscribe the scope of this self-reflective activity is new and symptomatic of the extraordinary fragmentation of twentieth-century philosophical discourse, what Michael Friedman has called 'a parting of the ways' (2000). This fragmentation revealed what Arthur C. Danto beautifully portrayed in his essay 'Philosophizing Literature' (which is itself of a metaphilosophical kind): 'Philosophy in the twentieth century may be exactly defined by the kind of problem it has become for itself' (1986: 167). As a result, the emergence of a 'larger self-detached perspective' (Rescher 2014: xi) investigating the nature of philosophy led to the establishment of metaphilosophy as a new, recognizable philosophical branch.

Metaphilosophical inquiry addresses many much-debated issues related to philosophy's aims, tasks, mission, objects, methods, languages, styles, approaches, limits and prospects. Other topics include the relation of philosophy to other disciplines in general – particularly the natural sciences – as well as its relevance to society and individuals. All these topics are investigated in the attempt to give philosophy 'a self-image that does it justice' (Williamson 2007: ix).

However, before even considering the scope of this discipline, one must confront the problematic status of metaphilosophy. As a self-detached analysis, it seems to stand beyond (or above) philosophy. Just as metaphysics has been traditionally understood as a discipline that transcends or exceeds what physics can tell us, the idea of metaphilosophical inquiry might encourage imagining a level of investigation transcending philosophy. Indeed, the question is tricky. Many issues in metaphilosophical debates are somewhat amphibious. Questions about whether philosophy is useful for society, whether it is useful in general or even whether it is a proper science can also be answered with predominantly sociological, classificatory or political tools, thus becoming judgements about philosophy conducted from an external perspective. The risk of interpreting metaphilosophy as an activity outside philosophy leads Timothy Williamson to prefer the expression 'the philosophy of philosophy' to emphasize that investigating the nature of philosophy is nothing different from philosophy itself: nothing outside or above it (Williamson 2007: ix). Today, the idea that metaphilosophy is 'the project of examining philosophy itself from a philosophical point of view' (Rescher 2014: xi) is well established; however, this was not so obvious at its origins, when the metaphilosophical enterprise primarily represented an effort to ground and justify philosophy.

Indeed, one might wonder why a certain kind of reflection that previously did not need to be explicitly named later emerged with the status of an autonomous philosophical discipline. It is both ironic and profoundly serious, having to do with the (scientific) legitimacy of philosophy, the rethinking of its mission and the demand for a methodological revolution combined with a reconsideration of philosophy's objects of investigation.

Twentieth-century attempts to reconstruct or even replace philosophy responded to the need for a justification of the philosophical enterprise in its own domain and in terms of societal and scientific legitimation, especially in its confrontation with science and more empirical disciplines. The conceptual terrain for philosophers' radical questioning of their own discipline was already mature in the first decades of

the century. Take works such as Edmund Husserl's *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (1911) or, on the other side of the ocean, John Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920, republished in 1948 with the revised title *Reconstruction of Philosophy*).

Even though the elements were already in place for the emergence of metaphilosophy and the term itself had already seen occasional use in different languages,[6] it gained visibility and started to be used in a technical sense in the late 1960s in Anglophone analytic settings. In those years, Richard Rorty was holding a seminar at Princeton examining many of the ideas that would later appear in *The Linguistic Turn* (1967). His seminar inspired a young scholar, Terrell Ward Bynum, to launch the journal *Metaphilosophy* in 1970, which aimed to create a venue for scholarly dialogue 'about the nature of philosophy, or how the different schools or branches of philosophy relate to each other, or how philosophy relates to other disciplines' (Bynum 2011: 186).

The appearance of explicit metaphilosophy and its connection with both the emergence and criticism of linguistic philosophy highlight a certain structural characteristic of metaphilosophical reflection: its focus on methodological and foundational issues. The 'view that philosophical problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use' (Rorty 1992: 3) points the finger at philosophy's methodology and the status of its objects. In the twentieth century, such problems arose with increased urgency, as the very future of philosophy was at stake. The ultimate question was whether philosophy would continue to exist or would have to give way to another kind of theoretical activity, a Wittgensteinian need for a reconstruction or even a revolution of philosophy that would act 'against philosophy as a pseudo-science' (Rorty 1992: 23) in the knowledge that, once this purge was carried out, something like philosophy might no longer exist.

At the same time, the methodological problem was (and is) also linked to foundational concerns. The 'idea that philosophical problems can be dissolved by detecting the "logic of our language"' (Rorty 1992: 373) manifested in the search for something prior to and more fundamental than philosophy that was able to advance it or make it superfluous. The linguistic project reflected the problematic outcomes of the debates on these foundational issues that characterized early twentieth-century philosophy and that produced various attempts to place the burden of a foundational role for philosophy on the shoulders of either logic or semantics.

In the 1992 re-edition of *The Linguistic Turn*, Rorty included two additional essays (meaningfully and gravely entitled 'Ten Years After' and 'Twenty-Five Years After') in which he expressed his verdict on the failure of the linguistic project, which, according to him, did not succeed in fulfilling its goal to convert philosophy into a strict science (see Rorty 1992: 33). This failure was primarily a methodological bankruptcy, with consequences for the very possibility of defining philosophy and its objects. Such an outcome and the historicist trajectory Rorty had embraced drove him to resist the idea 'that philosophy is a special field of inquiry distinguished by a special method' (1992: 374) and by problems *distinctively* philosophical, 'as naming a natural kind' (1992: 371). 'Questions about "the method of philosophy" or about "the nature of philosophical problems"' had simply proved to be 'unprofitable' (Rorty 1992: 374).

Ultimately, the rise of metaphilosophy is closely related to the need for a revolution in philosophical methods and brings to the foreground issues about the foundation of philosophy, its right to exist and its legitimation on a scientific level.

More recently, despite Rorty's warning, contemporary (meta)philosophers have not seemed inclined to give up questions about the method and objects of philosophy.[7] The thorny issue of philosophy's scientificity still requires much ink and thought, and philosophy's relation to other branches of knowledge (especially the natural sciences) is a crucial topic today in understanding the limits of philosophy – its capacity to determine and ground itself or its need to rely on other disciplines as crutches. Since the 1960s, much has changed in terms of the details and contents of proposed metaphilosophical theories, but the main questions still persist. Two topics in particular never seem to be exhausted: the question of method and philosophy's (problematic) scientificity.

Philosophy's scientificity and the question of method

Philosophy seems to be structurally marked by a frustrating condition. As Husserl put it in *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*, on the one hand, philosophy has repeatedly claimed for itself the status of a rigorous science, but on the other, it has never been able to fulfil this expectation. This is not an unprecedented thought in the history of philosophy, which is 'punctuated by revolts against the practices of previous philosophers and by attempts to transform philosophy into science – a discipline in which universally recognized decision-procedures are available for testing philosophical theses' (Rorty 1992: 1).

The relationship between the methods of the empirical, experimental sciences and philosophical procedures is one of the most challenging problems philosophy has faced since the early seventeenth century, with the rise of modern experimental science. To make a long story short, philosophers had to conform to a radically new idea of science and figure out how their discipline had to be transformed or at least reformed to preserve its 'scientific' character.[8] The modern era has indeed confronted philosophy with a dilemma that does not yet seem resolved: either philosophy must surrender claims to scientificity or must model itself on the natural sciences.

Today, this dilemma attends to the question of *naturalism* in philosophy (a single label for many positions). Intrinsic to this question is the discussion about whether philosophy should be understood as a humanistic discipline or a scientific enterprise. Naturalist philosophers perceive philosophy in continuity with science or even favour its assimilation to the latter, encouraging the employment of the standard methods of empirical science.[9] Other authors charge this position with *scientism*: 'a misunderstanding of the relations between philosophy and the natural sciences which tends to assimilate philosophy to the aims, or at least the manners, of the sciences' (Williams 2006: 182). This criticism does not imply, however, that philosophy should be uninterested or uninvolved in the sciences, but it is a different matter to claim that philosophy should shape itself according to them. Positions exist in between, according

to some of which philosophy is a science – a logic of concepts (e.g. McGinn 2015) – without being assimilated to the natural or social sciences.[10]

A vital point in addressing the scientificity of philosophy is the methodological question. A typically modern approach to the problem is that, in addition to the object of investigation, evaluating the correct method of conducting that investigation is increasingly important. Determining the methods and objects of philosophy also entails determining its scientific nature and consequently the relationship between philosophy and science.

Hegel himself recognized the problematic nature of philosophy in relation to the notion of science: in the opening paragraph of the *Encyclopaedia* (1830), he stated that philosophy cannot enjoy the 'advantage from which the other sciences benefit, namely the ability to *presuppose* both its *objects* as immediately endorsed by representation of them and an acknowledged *method* of knowing, which would determine its starting-point and progression' (EL, §1). Philosophical activity necessarily implies the justification of both. Between the lines, this aspect actually indicates added value for Hegel, as it is precisely this process of justification that guarantees philosophy a scientific status.

Whether one agrees with Hegel or not, his reflections are not misplaced. A brief look at the history of philosophy makes it obvious that philosophy cannot assume its methods and objects as given. Indeed, 'it isn't obviously the case that there is a particular region of objects (like stars and planets or diseases of the skin) that philosophers make it their special business to study' (Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood 2013: 2) and the question about what method(s) philosophy should apply to achieve real knowledge about the objects it investigates produces the same discomfort.

Nicholas Rescher individuated philosophy's scope as the '"big questions" that we have regarding the world's scheme of things and our place within it' (2014: 1). This is nevertheless too general a picture to appreciate the (possibly) unique nature of the objects of philosophy. Big questions about the world and human condition are likely to cover an infinite number of subject matters; moreover, many topics can also be examined by other disciplines, thus demonstrating that the objects that philosophy investigates have nothing *distinctively* philosophical about them in the sense of making up 'a natural kind'.

Against this backdrop, we could ask whether philosophy's distinctive character is rather to be found in its method(s). The multiplicity of philosophical methods that have been developed historically, especially since the beginning of the twentieth century, illuminates the arduousness of justifying a completely affirmative answer.[11] Williamson's words seem appropriate here: 'Forget the idea of a single method … philosophers use methods of various kinds: they philosophize in various ways' (2007: 3).

The evidence that we cannot guarantee a method upon which all (or at least most) philosophers agree is not the only impediment. In recent years, a new branch of philosophy has emerged – experimental philosophy – which complicates things even further.

Despite divergences in styles, conceptions and methods, until a few decades ago, most philosophy practitioners would have agreed that 'the activity of philosophizing differed in significant ways from the typical activities of empirical scientists' (D'Oro and Overgaard 2017: 1). Naturalists themselves, despite their theories, 'did not necessarily

do philosophy any differently from the way it had traditionally been done: in the main without relying substantively on – let alone actively collecting – empirical data' (D'Oro and Overgaard 2017: 1).

Nevertheless, the ascription of *a priori* methods to philosophy and of *a posteriori* methods to the empirical sciences is no longer obvious. With the rise of experimental philosophy,[12] as opposed to armchair philosophy, the situation has changed. While armchair philosophy relies on methods that can be developed and applied while sitting in an armchair 'without any special interaction with the world beyond the armchair, such as measurement, observation or experiment would typically involve' (Williamson 2007: 1), experimental philosophy is based on the idea that it is necessary 'to test philosophical thought experiments and philosophers' intuitions about them with scientific methods, mostly taken from psychology and the social sciences' (Horvath and Grundmann 2012: 1). Accordingly, philosophical theses or arguments, especially in the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy, should be verified empirically exploiting experimental data.[13] The main risk implied by experimental philosophy (evaluating the use of concepts employing experimental data) is that philosophy collapses into the fields of other disciplines by borrowing their methods, thus reinforcing the belief that it cannot 'usefully proceed until the experiments are done' (Williamson 2007: 6).

In the face of these difficulties, a conception of philosophy that eliminates its irreducible uniqueness might seem preferable. This position finds its best expression in Timothy Williamson's thesis about the 'unexceptional nature of philosophy'. In his work *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, he firmly criticized 'the common assumption of philosophical exceptionalism' (2007: 3). This theoretical move excluded any philosophical 'natural kind', to borrow Rorty's terminology. Against arguments for philosophy's exceptional nature, he maintained that 'the philosophical ways of thinking are not different in kind from the other ways' (Williamson 2007: 4) and that 'the differences in subject matter between philosophy and the other sciences are also less deep than is often supposed' (2007: 3). As with philosophical procedures, 'philosophical questions are not different in kind from other questions' (2007: 4).[14]

Even in rejecting the idea of substantial differences between philosophical methods and the methods of other disciplines, however, Williamson remained a defender of armchair philosophy. He believed that rethinking philosophy's methodology did not necessarily imply that philosophy should model itself on the empirical sciences. At the same time, 'that philosophy *can* be done in an armchair does not entail that it *must* be done in an armchair' (Williamson 2007: 6). In his view, the results of scientific, empirical experiments may be relevant to philosophical investigations, but philosophy could nevertheless proceed without them.

Interestingly, this understanding of philosophy as unexceptional is equally a move to legitimize and reaffirm it against approaches that assume natural science as the model of theoretical construction to which philosophical activity should conform. In this picture, philosophy is not more – and much more importantly, not less – than the natural and social sciences. In a sense, Williamson's book developed a discourse that presents philosophy as 'simply' a specific discipline – just as other scientific disciplines are – and thus as self-determining in the formation of its own practices, methods and scientific communities.

Seeing philosophy as a discipline amongst others certainly has salutary implications, as it dismantles philosophy's claim to be 'par excellence, the repository of thought' – a persuasion that 'has fuelled an unnecessary and unmotivated opposition to science' in the past (Parrini 2018: 13–14). Nevertheless, a discourse pointing to philosophy's unexceptionalism (in a context where, at the end of the day, no discipline is exceptional) might have the externality of 'normalizing' philosophy, deflating its possibly original contributions. If philosophy is supposed to do more or less the same work as other disciplines but with inferior results and credibility, then what is the point of philosophy at all? Arguing for the unexceptional nature of philosophy, though bypassing some theoretical difficulties, may not be enough to prevent philosophical practice from falling into the gravitational field of the social and empirical sciences.

Hegel's metaphilosophy

Hegel's case is meaningful for metaphilosophical reflection for at least two reasons: how he approached philosophy and how his provocative conception of philosophy challenges our philosophical patterns, convictions and classifications.

Hegel came late to philosophy after being extremely sceptical and polemical about it. He showed up with a theoretical position in the philosophical debate of his time comparatively late. In fact, his early writings were primarily intended as a cultural critique that also targeted philosophy understood as an abstract exercise of the intellect (*Verstand*). His late entry into the public philosophical debate does not mean, of course, that he did not engage in philosophical questions in his youth. However, until roughly the age of 30 (in 1800), he did not conceive of his own intellectual enterprise as fully intrinsic to philosophy. Rather, he judged philosophy as an intellectualistic form of knowledge unable to grasp the concreteness and dynamism of historical actuality and, for this very reason, equally incapable of acting effectively on the lives and concrete experience of human beings.

This is an element that makes Hegel's metaphilosophical position particularly interesting: his reflection on the nature of philosophy started from a sceptical standpoint, aimed at producing a genuine critique of philosophy's limits. At the same time, his criticism contained ideas about what philosophical activity should accomplish and the fundamental theoretical and practical elements that would later converge into his philosophical system.

In a well-known letter to Schelling dated 2 November 1800, Hegel depicted his training path, giving us a vivid image of a tension between different theoretical drives apparently not quite compatible with each other.

> In my scientific development, which started from [the] more subordinate needs of man, I was inevitably driven toward science, and the ideal of [my] youth had to take the form of reflection and thus at once of a system. I now ask myself, while I am still occupied with it, what return to intervention in the life of men can be found.
>
> (LE, 64)

This much-quoted excerpt allows us to appreciate the constitutive theoretical orientations Hegel had developed in his youth that shaped his later conception of philosophy. Specifically, two aspects emerge: an attention to the more subordinate needs of human beings (which testify to the theoretical path undertaken during his formative years) and a new focus on science and its systematic form (which represents the new direction Hegel took in his maturity).

Beside these aspects, as a key connecting element, is the question about the possibility of science or philosophy effectively affecting the lives of human beings. Indeed, the young Hegel was driven by a twofold theoretical need: on the one hand, he sought to analyse the forms of division and laceration that, according to him, pervaded modernity (hence his talk of the more subordinate needs of humans); on the other, his scrutiny also aimed to grasp the elements from which those lacerating experiences had originated to think of possible ways to overcome them.

There is already much metaphilosophical substance here. In Hegel's vision, effective philosophy is called to transform the lives of individuals by providing them with critical conceptual tools to surmount abstract forms of life and imagine or model new ones. The point here is the transformative work of philosophy, which cannot be limited to therapeutic activity but, based on rational critique, must also be creative and productive. Moreover – and this is the challenge – such transformative work must be integrated into and conciliated with systematic science.

Here, we come to the second point mentioned above: the thought-provoking potential of Hegel's concept of philosophy as a systematic whole. This intersects with foundational issues with philosophy, its scientific status, its relation to the other sciences, its historical development, questions of its method, concerns about its autonomy and its connection to freedom. Hegel's late systematic conception of philosophy especially touches on most of the issues raised by contemporary metaphilosophy.

Hegel challenges us on several fronts, calling into question some convictions and commonplaces of today's philosophical debates. He forces us to think about how philosophy can be essentially scientific and in continuity with the other sciences while distinguishing itself from their epistemology. Hegel's view on this point can be regarded as an attempt to justify and ground philosophy, resisting the idea of its 'normalization' through its reduction or elevation – depending on the perspective – to the status of a particular science.

In addition, Hegel invites us to conceive of philosophy as 'the science of freedom' (E17, §5), where freedom means embracing the radical impossibility of philosophy to ground itself on something other than itself as well as the process of transforming presuppositions into posited determinations within philosophy's self-justifying rational development.

To continue, Hegel requires us to rediscuss philosophy's complex relationship with its history and, jointly, the relationship between conceptual determinations and time. His position defies the mainstream dichotomy today between philosophy as a theoretical production of theses and arguments, on the one hand, and the history of philosophy as a rational reconstruction of past theories, on the other. The first stance seems to imply that philosophy does not need history or the historical-conceptual reconstruction of past philosophies. Simultaneously, the history of philosophy, aiming

to be rigorous, conceives of itself as a neutral theoretical enterprise above the fray of philosophical debates and decisions. Hegel's position radically questions such a 'quiet' division of labour. For Hegel, philosophy separated from its historical development is only an abstraction incapable of understanding the world in its concrete, historical complexity. Indeed, the history of philosophy as a purely neutral operation is just an attempt to destroy philosophy, with the hidden purpose of showing that it is nothing at all in itself. According to Hegel, a history of philosophy that claims philosophical neutrality can in fact only highlight philosophy's inability to achieve substantial results and to overcome the status of a sterile, continuous juxtaposition of theories.

Against this background, this volume contains the writing of twenty-six scholars from diverse schools of Hegelian thought investigating Hegel's concept of philosophy to bring it to bear on contemporary metaphilosophical debates. Ultimately, this volume's claim is that Hegel's philosophical perspective on philosophy itself offers a significant, insightful contribution to these discussions.

The volume comprises four parts. Part One, 'Hegel's Metaphilosophy', includes contributions that bring Hegel's conception of philosophy under the lens of multifaceted examination. Some specific aspects are considered: Hegel's overall metaphilosophical project; his conception of the scientificity of philosophy as a self-grounding rational process; the development and novelty of his philosophical method; and his conception of philosophy's connection with critique and freedom. Part Two, 'Hegel's Metaphilosophy and its Aesthetic, Religious and Historical-Political Dimensions', concentrates on Hegel's view on philosophy's relation to other forms of human production such as art and religion, as well as to the social and political aspects of human life. This section also investigates Hegel's explanation of the relationship between philosophy, time and the history of philosophy. Part Three, 'Hegel's Metaphilosophy in Context', considers Hegel's metaphilosophical view within the context of classical German philosophy (here represented by Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling). Part Four, 'Hegel's Metaphilosophy and Contemporary Thought', extends this perspective, intersecting Hegel's 'philosophy of philosophy' with more recent philosophical strands and traditions: pragmatism, the historicist tradition, quietism, the recent prolific wave of so-called Pittsburgh neo-Hegelianism, Critical Theory, naturalism, contemporary metaphysics, 'post-analytic' philosophy and contemporary metaphilosophy. This path brings Hegel's metaphilosophical reflection into dialogue with twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophers, such as Robert Brandom, Jacques Derrida, Jean Hyppolite, Rahel Jaeggi, Alexandre Kojève, Alexandre Koyré, John McDowell, Robert Pippin, Richard Rorty, Wilfrid Sellars and others.

Of course, this volume has no claim to exhaustiveness. It represents a first, still-incomplete attempt to draw attention to the impressive metaphilosophical dimension of Hegel's philosophy, probing some of its central aspects and their relevance to contemporary debates. The hope is to show how Hegel's (philosophy of) philosophy ceaselessly regenerates its power to trigger questions, prise open conceptual rigidities and push towards a critical, imaginative rethinking of philosophical theory and practice.

Notes

1   Considering Hegelian thought in its development, it would perhaps be more correct to speak of metaphilosophical *conceptions*, emphasizing the plural. Notoriously, the conception of philosophy that characterizes Hegel's early thought is different from that of the late Hegel. On the conception of philosophy in the first phase of Hegel's speculation, see Harris (1971, 1983). For simplicity's sake, we will use the singular here, always bearing in mind Hegel's evolution of his understanding of philosophy.

2   There is comparatively little secondary literature *expressly* referring to Hegel's metaphilosophy, see, for example, Berthold-Bond (1986), Ware (1996), Markis (2004), Illetterati (2013), Halbig (2015), Miolli (2017), Kreines (2012, 2017) and Siani (2020). What is more, there is only one book dedicated to the specific topic of Hegel's metaphilosophy (Theunissen 2014), which is mostly centred on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

3   In particular, for Horstmann, the idea of systematicity characterizing Hegel's philosophy is connected to three main claims: ontological, methodological and epistemological, which are amongst the aspects of Hegel's speculation that risk having 'no intrinsic value for us anymore' (1999: 277).

4   According to Horstmann, the reason for this impossibility is that 'our understanding of what one should do in philosophy has changed' (1999: 281) – which is another way of saying that our metaphilosophical convictions have shifted substantially.

5   See Rescher (2014: xi): 'The key fact about metaphilosophy is that it forms a part of philosophy itself. This is a unique feature of the enterprise: the philosophy of biology is not a part of biology, the philosophy of mathematics is not a part of mathematics.'

6   Morris Lazerowitz (1970: 1), a student of Wittgenstein, claimed to have invented the English word 'metaphilosophy' in 1940. Concerns have been raised about this claim: equivalent expressions have been used in other languages before 1940, in particular referring to Martin Heidegger and Karl Marx (see Joll 2017: Section B). For a reconstruction of the conceptual history of the term, see Geldsetzer (1974, 1989), Rescher (1985, 2001, 2014), Theunissen (2014), and Joll (2017).

7   A particular emphasis on method permeates much metaphilosophical literature. Rorty noted that revolutions (or revolts) in the history of philosophy have typically been accompanied by attempts to adopt new methods (see Rorty 1992: 1). The subtitle of *The Linguistic Turn* itself is *Essays in Philosophical Method*. In referring to his book *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, Timothy Williamson states that he had considered 'using the phrase "philosophical method" in the title' (2007: ix). Rescher (2006: 1) argued that the definitive aim of metaphilosophy is 'to study the methods' of philosophy itself 'in an endeavor to illuminate its promise and prospects'. For a detailed overview on the methodological question in philosophy, see D'Oro and Overgaard (2017).

8   Just to mention one aspect, the new standard of science implied the use of mathematical models. In the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Kant claimed that 'in any special doctrine of nature there can be – in fact – only as much *proper* science as there is *mathematics* therein' ([1786] 1968: 470).

9   See, for example, Rosenberg (2014: 42): 'The humanities … need naturalism to show how interpretation is grounded in science.'

10 Quine could also fit into this latter position, as he is seen as advocating the idea that philosophy is part of science but deals with the more abstract, theoretical aspects of

it (see Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood 2013: 26–27). Unsurprisingly, there is an array of views about the relationship between philosophy and science. For a useful reconstruction, see Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood (2013: 24–69).

11   The following are just some of the methods and approaches available in contemporary philosophy: conceptual analysis, Critical Theory, experimental philosophy, hermeneutical methodology, naturalistic methodology, phenomenology, pragmatism, deconstructionist methodology and linguistic therapy (D'Oro and Overgaard 2017). In general, the problems we have mentioned concerning the individuation of both the objects and methods of philosophy are part of the reason why essentialist definitions of philosophy, which seek an 'x' underlying everything understood as 'philosophy', present significant theoretical difficulties. Both methodological and topical definitions of philosophy cannot be exhaustive or precise, ranging from too circumscribed to too general (see Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood 2013: 20–22).

12   See Knobe and Nichols (2008, 2014).

13   See Prinz (2008).

14   Note that experimental philosophers also reject an exceptionalist conception of philosophy, as it would not represent any privileged stance in the understanding of concepts (see Knobe and Nichols 2008).

References

Berthold-Bond, D. (1986), 'Hegel on Metaphilosophy and the "Philosophic Spectator"', *Idealistic Studies*, 16 (3): 205–217.

Bynum, T.W. (2011), 'Creating the Journal *Metaphilosophy*', *Metaphilosophy*, 42 (3): 186–190.

Danto, A.C. (1986), *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art*, New York: Columbia University Press.

D'Oro, G. and S. Overgaard, eds (2017), *The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Friedman, M. (2000), *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger*, Chicago: Open Court.

Geldsetzer, L. (1974), 'Metaphilosophie als Metaphysik. Zur Hermeneutik der Bestimmung der Philosophie', *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie*, 5 (2): 247–255.

Geldsetzer, L. (1989), 'Philosophie der Philosophie', in J. Ritter, K. Gründer and G. Gabriel (eds), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, 7, Columns 904–911, Basel: Schwabe Verlag.

Halbig, C. (2015), 'Vorstellung und Denken als epistemologische und als metaphilosophische Kategorien bei Hegel', in K. Drilo and A. Hutter (eds), *Spekulation und Vorstellung in Hegels enyzklopädischem System*, 157–178, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Harris, H.S. (1971), *Hegel's Development Toward the Sunlight: 1770–1801*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harris, H.S. (1983), *Hegel's Development II. Night Thoughts (Jena 1801–1806)*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Horstmann, R.-P. (1999), 'What Is Hegel's Legacy and What Should We Do with It?', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 7 (2): 275–287.

Horvath, J. and T. Grundmann, eds (2012), *Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics*, London and New York: Routledge.

Illetterati, L. (2013), 'Sulla metafilosofia hegeliana', in G. Erle (ed.), *Il limite e l'infinito*, 217–234, Verona: ArchetipoLibri.

Joll, N. (2017), 'Contemporary Metaphilosophy', *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Available online: http://www.iep.utm.edu/con-meta/ (accessed 15 May 2020).

Kant, I. ([1786] 1968), *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, vol. 4, Berlin: Akademie Textausagabe.

Knobe, J. and S. Nichols, eds (2008), *Experimental Philosophy*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Knobe, J. and S. Nichols, eds (2014), *Experimental Philosophy: Volume 2*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Kreines, J. (2012), 'Learning from Hegel What Philosophy Is All About: For the Metaphysics of Reason and Against the Priority of Semantics', *Verifiche*, 41 (1–3): 129–173.

Kreines, J. (2017), 'The Limits of Metatheory and the Interpretation of Hegel's System', *Verifiche*, 46 (1): 36–61.

Lazerowitz, M. (1970), 'A Note on "Metaphilosophy"', *Metaphilosophy*, 1 (1): 91.

Markis, D. (2004), 'Hegel. Hermeneutik der Metaphilosophie', *Philosophical Inquiry*, 26 (3): 11–31.

McGinn, C. (2015), 'The Science of Philosophy', *Metaphilosophy*, 46 (1): 84–103.

Miolli, G. (2017), 'Hegel e metafilosofia: mappa di un problema', *Verifiche*, 46 (1): 83–128.

Overgaard, S., P. Gilbert and S. Burwood (2013), *An Introduction to Metaphilosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Parrini, P. (2018), *Fare filosofia, oggi*, Rome: Carocci.

Prinz, J.J. (2008), 'Empirical Philosophy and Experimental Philosophy', in J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds), *Experimental Philosophy*, 189–208, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Rescher, N. (1985), *The Strife of Systems: An Essay on the Grounds and Implications of Philosophical Diversity*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Rescher, N. (2001), *Philosophical Reasoning: A Study in the Methodology of Philosophizing*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Rescher, N. (2006), *Philosophical Dialectics: An Essay on Metaphilosophy*, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Rescher, N. (2014), *Metaphilosophy: Philosophy in Philosophical Perspective*, London: Lexington Books.

Rorty, R.M., ed. ([1967] 1992), *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method (with Two Retrospective Essays)*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Rosenberg, A. (2014), 'Can Naturalism Save the Humanities?', in M.C. Haug (ed.), *Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?*, 39–42, London and New York: Routledge.

Siani, A.L. (2020), 'Modern Philosophy and Philosophical Modernity: Hegel's Metaphilosophical Commitment', in J. Chotaš and T. Matějčková (eds), *An Ethical Modernity? Hegel's Concept of Ethical Life Today*, 191–203, Boston: Brill.

Theunissen, B. (2014), *Hegels "Phänomenologie" als metaphilosophische Theorie. Hegel und das Problem der Vielfalt philosophischer Theorien. Eine Studie zur systemexternen Rechtfertigungsfunktion der Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Hegel-Studien, supplement 61, Hamburg: Felix Meiner.

Ware, R.B. (1996), 'Hegel's Metaphilosophy and Historical Metamorphosis', *History of Political Thought*, 17 (2): 253–279.

Williams, B. (2006), *Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline*, Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Williamson, T. (2007), *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, Oxford: Blackwell.