INTRODUCTION

VALENTINA RICCI
AND FEDERICO SANGUINETTI

The volume we present here is a collection of essays on the role of the concept of recollection (Erinnerung) in the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. The choice to focus on this concept has been determined by the conviction that Erinnerung plays a crucial role not only for the understanding of individual parts of Hegel's system, but also for the understanding of the system as a whole. The speculative significance of such a concept is to be found in the fact that it engages and simultaneously structures some central issues of Hegel's philosophy, such as the relationship of temporality and eternity, history and logic, subjectivity and objectivity, nature and culture, empirical subjectivity and the intersubjective and absolute dimension of spirit.

The volume takes up an important theoretical challenge, i.e. to examine the concept of Erinnerung at different levels of the system in order to offer a contribution to the formulation of a unitary and comprehensive account of this concept, through the acknowledgment of the specific character and the autonomy of its different instances. The essays presented here, therefore, aim at encouraging the development of a unitary interpretation of the concept of recollection through the detailed discussion of its role within different, specific parts of Hegel's system. This undertaking is led by the persuasion that the relationship between the different instances of this concept constitutes a privileged key to the interpretation of the system and allows a deeper understanding of some essential speculative moments of the system itself.

Before proceeding to the presentation of the volume's structure and content, however, we wish to situate the present study within the broader field of Hegelian scholarship. One of the main reasons that led to plan this

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1 In the course of the volume, we will often leave the German word “Erinnerung” untranslated, since no English word can fully convey the richness of its original meaning and of the specific nuances it acquires depending on the context.
volume has been the lack, in the context of Hegel-studies, of a thorough
discussion of the concept of Erinnerung including all the parts of the
system where this concept plays a significant role. This is not to imply,
however, that the literature does not offer precious tools for the analysis
and discussion of the issue. On the contrary, one can find many such tools:
what seems to be missing in the studies that deal specifically or engage to
some extent with the topic is a comprehensive kind of approach, providing
a detailed discussion of the role of Erinnerung in the individual parts of
the system and being at the same time mindful of the global import of the
concept within Hegel’s system; this would allow for an attempt to lay the
foundation of a comprehensive perspective. In what follows, therefore, we
present and discuss what has been published up to this point in the field of
Hegelian studies regarding the concept of recollection. We will then
proceed to the actual introduction of our volume and its contents.

1. Status Quaestionis

The concept of Erinnerung has often been implicitly indicated as a
central concept within the speculative structure of Hegel’s system.
However, to offer an exhaustive survey of the secondary literature dealing
with the concept of Erinnerung is certainly not an easy task. The reason
for this difficulty is twofold. On the one hand, there are few significant
monographs focusing specifically on recollection and the whole of its
semantic and speculative richness. On the other hand, the concept of
Erinnerung is discussed in essays and studies that are very different from
one another regarding both their focus and their aim.

1) During the last century, a consideration of the concept of
Erinnerung has emerged within analyses focusing on specific spheres or
parts of the system. This group includes the commentaries to the parts of
the system where Erinnerung plays an important role and some more
specific articles. Among these:
(a) commentaries devoted to the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,
especially to the Encyclopedia Psychology2 or, more generally, articles and

2 See for example: I. Fetscher, Hegels Lehre vom Menschen: Kommentar zu den
387 bis 482 der „Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften“ (Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstatt: Fromman-Holzboog, 1970), 160-161; R.D. Winfield, Hegel and
Mind: Rethinking Philosophical Psychology (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), in
particular 84-88; W. DeVries, Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity: An Introduction to
Theoretical Spirit (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1988), 125-134; D.
Stederoth, Hegels Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes. Ein komparatorischer
Kommentar (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), 356-362; J. Rometsch, Hegels
texts analyzing the role of recollection in this part of the system;\(^3\) (b) commentaries devoted to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*\(^4\) and other texts dealing with the role of Erinnerung in the *Phenomenology*;\(^5\) (c) commentaries and works on the *Science of Logic*;\(^6\) (d) other studies

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analyzing the role of Erinnerung in the philosophy of history, in the philosophy of art, and in the philosophy of religion. In several of these essays the concept of Erinnerung is simply mentioned and is not the object of a specific and detailed discussion.

2) On the other hand, the concept of Erinnerung has constituted the starting point for comparisons between Hegel and other authors.

3) Among the scholars who provided deeper readings of the concept of Erinnerung, the first deserving mention is certainly E. Bloch, who discerned in the notion of Erinnerung the root of the substantially closed character of Hegel’s system. Bloch sees Hegel’s Erinnerung as the heir of


8 See D.J. Kwon, Das Ende der Kunst: Analyse und Kritik der Voraussetzungen von Hegels These (Würzburg: Königshausen-Neumann, 2004), 70ff.


the Platonic concept of anamnesis and of the Neoplatonic theory of emanation, according to which reality would be always already comprised in its principle. Even though recollection cannot be reduced to the psychological recapitulation of the past, it internalizes (verinnerlicht) the latter in the present and thus results in being an act of disregard toward the future. Although Bloch emphasizes that Hegel—as opposed to Plato—does not regard actuality as something that is always already given, but as something that takes shape through its own becoming, Hegel’s system remains closed within the “magic circle” of anamnesis.

Also the Hegelian process of the result, therefore, is within the circle of anamnesis as within a magic circle. Everything here is full of New: however, in every final moment, especially at the end of the circle in general, the newest (in Hegel’s gigantic breaking philosophy, and in spite of it) must have always already been the oldest, with its prearranged, preordained, complete beginning. This prevents even the system of development from remaining a system open to development: it is subdued to the First, although the latter is not developed and not consumed, after which it starts. The restitutio in integrum brings back the expeditio in novum with the rope of epistrophé.

R. Bodei argued against this interpretation by trying to save the system’s openness to the future and criticizing Bloch’s Platonizing interpretation. According to Bodei, the meaning of Erinnerung as the

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12 In this respect, according to Bloch, Hegel is more similar to Plato than he himself would have been ready to admit. See E. Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt, 500: “The more Hegel defends his view against a weaker (merely psychological-reproductive) reading of the concept of recollection, the less recollection as inwardization escapes the depth of a Platonic anamnesis of the result of becoming. And the fact that Hegel, at this point, is so opposed to the reproduction of the result of becoming as the reproduction through representations, means precisely that the dialectic of the ‘truth […] in which no member is not drunk,’ is closer to the Platonic anamnesis seen as total reproduction than the most splendid system of development since Aristotle and Leibniz would like to.” (Our translation).

13 See E. Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt, 500-501: “So that truth, for Hegel, is not only, as for Plato, something that does not change and is eternal, but truth is, on the contrary, a result (although it manifests, or makes concrete, only the being-in-itself in the being-in-and-for-itself).” (Our translation).

14 E. Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt, 503. (Our translation).


16 See ibid., 14: “Hegel’s image of the owl, thus, is already a reference to the future, which is confirmed by the overall sense of his work. The owl’s nightly escape is not only resignation, ‘anamnestic’ meditation of the past, but also and at
The *Erinnerung* of absolute knowing does not imply, as Bloch claims, a renouncing of the progressive aspect of the dialectic in favor of a rumination of the past or of a knowledge that amounts to recollection (in a Platonic sense), but is a retracting before the jump; it is, as Hegel says in a text that is contemporary to the chapter on ‘absolute knowing,’ i.e. the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, a recapitulation of spirit’s weakened shapes before spirit faces a further progress: ‘The individual whose substance is the more advanced Spirit runs through this past just as one who takes up a higher science goes through the preparatory studies he has long since absorbed, in order to bring their content into mind: he recalls them in the inward eye, but has no lasting interest in them.’

J.L. Vieillard-Baron also criticizes Bloch’s reading. He emphasizes Hegel’s distance from Hölderlin and Novalis and criticizes the interpretation of the Hegelian *Erinnerung* as an anamnesis bound to some sort of the same time preparation of the future.” (Our translation).

See R. Bodei, *Sistema ed epoca*, 88-89: “From this viewpoint, the question of the ‘closure of history’ is nothing but the *delimitation*, performed by Hegel himself, of the historical and theoretical scope of validity of his own philosophy. The perspective of negating the future, therefore, is not there (as Bloch himself maintains). Simply, Hegel’s perspective is one claiming that every new emerging ‘epoch’—defined by the interval of relative continuity between two revolutions—rises with a qualitative leap whose outcome is not predictable in advance and requires a new philosophy.” (Our translation).

See R. Bodei, *Sistema ed epoca*, 90: “[T]he new is already visible in the present, the rose is nailed to the cross, and philosophy distinguishes precisely the new actuality both from the old one and from the utopian or prophetic one.” (Our translation).

R. Bodei, *Sistema ed epoca*, 180-181. (Our translation). See also ibid., 181: “Generally, this aspect remains hidden for two reasons: a) because the *Phenomenology* is not seen as part of a systematic whole—as Hegel was planning it—and its conclusion is regarded as a really ‘absolute’ conclusion rather than a beginning ‘at the same time from a higher level’; b) because the apparently dead end of *Erinnerung* is interpreted as spirit’s withdrawing into itself and not, at the same time, as the *point of inversion*—the apparent zero velocity at the peak of the trajectory—that precedes and accompanies every revolution of spirit.” (Our translation).

nostalgia toward the past. At the same time, he emphasizes Hegel’s distance from Schelling, thereby denying that the “mythic” component of *Erinnerung* aims at the transformation of philosophy into mythology.

Hegel, to begin with, excludes psychology’s and mythology’s pretense to exhaust the sense of recollection; both regard *Erinnerung* as the reproduction of what has been, be it due to nostalgia toward the past and the death or to the projection of the past into the future understood as a new golden age.

Against Bloch, Vieillard-Baron underscores a sort of Gnostic character of Hegel’s *Erinnerung*.

Far from being Proclus’ *epistrophé*, Hegel’s recollection invites us to a divinatory reflection [...] Therefore, Ernst Bloch’s thesis entirely contradicts Hegel’s idea: recollection, according to Hegel, enacts a ‘hope principle’; it alone opens a historical future that is capable of taking on the great hopes of mankind. This hope is nothing but the eternal present of the life with God.

H. Marcuse also disagrees with the idea that Hegel’s *Erinnerung* is responsible for the system’s closed character with respect to history and temporality. On the contrary, he tries to find the foundation of a theory of history in Hegel’s logic. Marcuse interprets the *Erinnerung* of being in essence as an ontological movement transcending the psychological
dimension of the individual. This movement is what grants the ontological possibility of a theory of history in Hegel:

The discovery of recollection as an ontological feature of spirit is the final proof of the ontological history of spirit [...].

If time is thus the element of externalization in which spirit manifests itself, its ontologically “recollecting” dimension enables spirit to prevent its own externalization in time from turning into an alienation in time as in its absolutely other; rather, it enables spirit—as being in time—to be reflexively comprehended in the structure of self-consciousness.

The very character of time which makes it an element of externalization at the same time contains the possibility of recollection as interiorization and

27 See H. Marcuse, Hegel’s Ontology, 68: “‘Recollection,’ of course, has nothing to do with the psychic phenomenon which we today mean with this term. It is a universal ontological category, a ‘movement of being itself’ which ‘re-collects itself in accordance with its own nature’ [...]. It is the ‘going into self’ of beings and their return back to self. But the decisive point is that unlike the mediations and negations of the something, which ran afoul (verlaufen) precisely because they occurred in the dimension of immediacy, this new movement is no longer confined to this dimension but can regress backward, thereby entering a new dimension—that of ‘timeless’ having been, or essence.” L. Di Carlo argues against Marcuse’s position in Tempo, autocoscienza e storia in Hegel (Napoli: Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, 2004). See ibid., 88: “The logical Erinnerung, besides being psychological recollection, is also a descending to the foundation of the thing, to its essence, an Erinnerung that is a withdrawing, a descending to the essential inwardness that is behind the appearance of the ‘being there’.” (Our translation). Di Carlo explicitly criticizes Marcuse’s (but also Verra’s and Schmitz’s) exclusively ontological and a-temporal interpretation of Hegel’s notion of Erinnerung (see ibid., 88-89, footnote 3): “According to my interpretation, the withdrawal of being also has a psychological meaning in virtue of the fact that this withdrawal presents itself as a temporal phenomenon: essence is being that is past, but an a-temporal past. This implies that essence founds a sequence of instances of ‘being-there’ that follow one another in time, in the same way as the young becomes old in virtue of the reflection of the essence ‘man’ in both of them. Recollection-Erinnerung is thus a descending in the essential inwardness of an immediate ‘being-there’ of the past.” (Our translation). Di Carlo’s study has the merit of providing a full and detailed discussion of the role of Erinnerung between the Phenomenology, the Science of Logic, and the system. With the aim of unifying different meanings of Hegel’s concept of Erinnerung, the text moves between different levels, but does not expound the relationships between the different levels in a rigorous and detailed way.

28 See H. Marcuse, Hegel’s Ontology, 317.
Besides the debate generated by Bloch’s reading of Hegel’s concept of Erinnerung, H. Schmitz’s article “Hegels Begriff der Erinnerung”30 is worth mentioning. Schmitz recognizes a twofold movement in the concept of Erinnerung: from the outside to the inside and from multiplicity to unity. Schmitz’s main merit is to recognize that the subject of this twofold movement cannot be spirit alone (and even less spirit in its merely subjective dimension). It is rather something that expresses the very essence of the movement of Hegel’s thought (the absolute), as the negation of what is external and the re-emerging of the latter in the inwardness through a process of self-comprehension.

V. Verra31 has focused on the connection between the concepts of Erinnerung and Bildung. By regarding Erinnerung as the twofold

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29 Ibid., 316. See also ibid., 306: “Difference must exist but only such that it is not real; it must be the kind of difference only through which spirit displays and produces the complete unity with itself. Such unity and freedom in difference is possible, however, only as a distinctive form of knowledge. Because spirit knows externalization to be its own and knowingly posits it, it does not alienate itself from itself and is not caught by it but remains by itself. It also remains by itself insofar as it no longer needs to turn back inward and away from this externalization because it becomes for-itself in it. In this fashion Spirit comes to know itself as objectivity, as objective existence,” and ibid., 316: “Hegel offers a solution to this problem insofar as for him the ‘living and immediate becoming’ is sublated into the ‘process of becoming which is reflected-into-itself’ in the course of the history of spirit as a whole. Both modes of becoming are forms of the externalization of spirit as a whole, but in the course of the history of spirit the externality of nature is simultaneously taken back and led over into the ‘form’ of self-consciousness. However, viewed as the history of spirit in its entirety, this ‘becoming-reflected-into-self’ is still a form of externalization, a mode of becoming in otherness; this process is also a coming-to-itself of absolute spirit, its own recollection of itself. In conclusion, Hegel once more puts forward this inner dualism of spirit, namely, of being-in-itself on the one hand and externalization and recollection on the other, essentially and estrangement.”

30 H. Schmitz, “Hegels Begriff der Erinnerung,” in Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 9 (1964): 37-44. Schmitz’s article seems to grasp the complexity of the movement of Erinnerung as well as the multiplicity of places where it is discussed in a conceptually relevant way. The brevity of the text, however, does not enable the author to expound the semantic richness of this concept and to fully argue for his theses.

movement of recollecting something past and of appropriating oneself within the same act, Verra identifies Erinnerung as the activity distinguishing human nature from merely organic nature. Whereas the universal which is not yet spirit (e.g. the organism) does not make itself internal to itself in its own realization, Erinnerung marks “the transition from a merely formal universality to a ‘true’ universality, which is to be found precisely in spirit’s persistence.” In this way, the human being is characterized as a historical animal:

In other words, the temporal development acquires—through the intersection of preservation-universalization-appropriation constituted by Erinnerung—a consistency and an organic structure that saves history from the danger of dissolving in the accidental and of being reduced to a series of shapes that are disconnected from one another or anyway isolated from the truest and profoundest essence of the process taking place in time and history. By rewording a famous phrase, one might say that through Erinnerung Hegel tries to discover and define the human being as a ‘historical animal,’ since it is precisely Erinnerung, as the condition of Bildung, that distinguishes spirit from every other form of inferior life, even though at an initial and somehow primordial level.

A further well-known interpretation of Hegel’s concept of Erinnerung is offered by J. Derrida, who reads this concept in light of the reconstruction of Hegel’s semiology he develops starting from his discussion of Hegel’s psychology. More specifically, Derrida regards memory-Erinnerung as the “signifying” activity that animates the intuitive, spatio-temporal content and the production of the sign:

This activity, which consists in animating the intuitive (spatial and temporal) content, of breathing a ‘soul,’ a ‘signification,’ into it, produces the sign by Erinnerung—memory and interiorization.

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32 See ibid., 9.
33 Ibid., 9. (Our translation). See also ibid., 19.
34 Ibid., 28. (Our translation). See also V. Verra, “Storia e seconda natura in Hegel,” in Su Hegel, ed. C. Cesa (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007), 66: “It is well know that Hegel was constantly trying to distinguish the historical from the natural process, the former being authentically progressive, the latter being purely repetitive.” (Our translation).
36 See ibid. 77: “Erinnerung, thus, is decisive here. By means of Erinnerung the content of sensible intuition becomes an image, freeing itself from immediacy and
4) In the course of the last decade, the concept of *Erinnerung* has received more attention from scholars who seem to have been interested in a more general and detailed study on the topic.

The work of interpreters such as A. Nuzzo and T. Rossi Leidi testifies that the lack of a monographic study on the speculative function(s) of the concept of *Erinnerung* has been noted and exhibits an effort to compensate for this lack. In several essays, Nuzzo has developed a specific analysis of the notion of *Erinnerung* in different contexts and has identified it as a central notion in Hegel’s system.37 In her last book, *Memory, History, Justice in Hegel*,38 Nuzzo collects the results of her studies on *Erinnerung* with the aim of providing new insight on Hegel’s idea of history, vindicating it from uncharitable interpretations and trying to reevaluate its relevance. The main tool for these tasks is the examination of the connection between history and memory.39 According to Nuzzo, Hegel’s system presents two different models for the understanding of history: on the one hand, a phenomenological understanding of history as collective memory, which she terms “ethical memory;” on the other hand, a systematic understanding of history structured according to the principles of justice and contradiction. The transition from the two understandings of history is made possible, according to Nuzzo, by the logical foundation of the philosophy of history, which, however, does not grant the compatibility or equivalence of the two models, but rather ranks the second model as higher. While history, in the phenomenological understanding, is conditioned by memory-*Erinnerung* in an “ideological, mythological, and metaphysical”40 sense, in the systematic understanding a twofold subversion takes place. The systematic memory-*Erinnerung*, which is

singularity in order to permit the passage to conceptuality.” See also ibid., 87.


39 Nuzzo speaks of *Erinnerung* as “memory” without sufficiently clarifying the terms of an extremely complex translation, most importantly as concerns the contemporary debate on history. This seems to be at least in part justified by the context of the book, which aims to make Hegel’s notion of *Erinnerung* fruitful for contemporary reflections.

founded on speculative logic, on the one hand acquires an absolute creative capacity which it manifests in the products of absolute spirit, and on the other hand it loses its own mystifying character and is subject “to the factual authority of history, to the objectivity of historical truth, and to historical justice.”

T. Rossi Leidi has devoted a rich volume to the notion of Erinnerung, which examines its different, specific functions in the philosophy of subjective spirit (including the version presented in the Jena system drafts), in the Science of Logic (with the merit of not limiting the analysis to the well-known transition from being to essence), in the Phenomenology and in the philosophy of history. While Rossi Leidi denies that one can find a “theory” of Erinnerung in Hegel’s system, he does not restrict himself to this negative conclusion. On the contrary, precisely because no theory of Erinnerung is to be found in Hegel’s philosophy, Rossi Leidi refers to a “broad” meaning of Erinnerung as Hegel’s Weltanschauung, as the guiding notion of Hegel’s system. The term Weltanschauung, here, is not employed accidentally: Rossi Leidi retraces a constellation of meanings of the term “Erinnerung” within the late Romantic and Idealistic culture around the end of the eighteenth century, which—even if pertaining to different theoretical contexts—revolves around the connection of anamnesis and internalization. It is from this cultural framework, according to Rossi Leidi, that Hegel inherited the concept of Erinnerung—and it is from the same framework that he distances himself by defining the concept of Erinnerung in the Phenomenology’s concluding pages: Hegel develops a view of Erinnerung between history and knowledge of the absolute, as history of the Bildung of spirit itself. Precisely this historical and immanent dimension of the absolute, according to Rossi Leidi, is what distinguishes Hegel from the Romantics, who tend to understand the absolute in a meta-historical dimension. The function of Erinnerung in the system, according to Rossi Leidi, can be understood starting from the phenomenological view: resting on the second of the three syllogisms that conclude Hegel’s Encyclopedia (the nature-spirit-logic syllogism, § 576), Rossi Leidi suggests a

41 Ibid.
43 See T. Rossi Leidi, Hegels Begriff der Erinnerung, 261.
44 See ibid., 278.
correspondence between the activity of Erinnerung and the activity of spirit as a whole. Spirit, in the course of its Bildung, sublates its immediacy by internalizing it and elevates itself to the absolute, which realizes itself precisely through the mediation of individual human beings in history.

2. Our Volume: Contents

The collection of essays we present aims at providing a detailed examination of the role played by the concept of Erinnerung within the different spheres of the system. When planning the book, we tried to cover all of the moments of Hegel’s production that present significant instances of the concept. Each chapter has been assigned to a scholar specializing on a specific part of the system, so that the present collection could profit from the specific sensibility of each scholar in order to fully illuminate the function and implications of the concept of Erinnerung.

The volume is composed of nine chapters, which cover Hegel’s writings starting from the Jena phase, with the Phenomenology and the system drafts, until the Berlin years with the third edition of the Encyclopedia and the lectures, through the Science of Logic. We decided to start from the Phenomenology and from its last chapter on absolute knowing in order to emphasize that Hegel’s very concept of philosophical science presupposes the concept of Erinnerung. From there, following a systematic order, the chapters focus on the role of Erinnerung in the logic, and then in the different spheres of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (Anthropology and Psychology, plus a chapter devoted to the connection between the psychological and logical dimension of thought), the Philosophy of Objective Spirit (philosophy of history) and the Philosophy of Absolute Spirit (art, religion, and philosophy).

The first chapter focuses on absolute knowledge in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Here recollection plays a central role as it enables the inwardization and comprehensive understanding of the moments that constitute the path of consciousness’s experience: Erinnerung is therefore responsible for the very attainment of absolute knowledge. In virtue of the role of recollection, absolute knowledge develops according to a complex dialectical relationship between the historical-temporal domain and the logical domain, the latter being the dimension to which absolute knowledge grants access.

The second chapter is devoted to the transition from the doctrine of being to the doctrine of essence in the Science of Logic. Here, Hegel claims that “knowing inwardizes, recollects [erinnert] itself out of
immediate being.” The aim of this chapter is to explain the meaning and the function of the notion of Erinnerung in this context: first, it outlines a comparative analysis of the negative self-referential and paradoxical dynamic underlying this passage of the *Science of Logic* and the ones at the basis of the Erinnerung process in the Psychology and in the final moment of the phenomenological path, i.e. absolute knowing. The final part of the chapter shows that the structure characterizing the Erinnerung process in the three levels under consideration—psychology, phenomenology and logic—is not accidental and is not meant to support a psychological reduction of the logical system either. Rather, the paradoxical structure of Erinnerung highlights the deep and necessary relationship between objective thought as self-determining subjectivity in the logic on the one hand and the subjectivity gaining access to objective thought in the Psychology on the other.

The third chapter analyzes the function of Erinnerung within Anthropology. Within this context a complex meaning of the term Erinnerung, i.e. internalization, recollection and reflection in itself is at stake in the transition from the determinacy existing in the natural world to the interiority of spirit. More specifically, on the one hand Erinnerung as internalization and recollection describes the process of external sensation. On the other hand, at the very end of this section, Erinnerung as reflection in itself of the actual soul ensures the dialectical transition from Anthropology to Phenomenology.

The fourth chapter is devoted to Hegel’s Psychology. It deals with Theoretical Spirit, the *Encyclopedia* section where Hegel discusses the development of the capacities of intelligence and where Erinnerung finds its proper systematic thematization. The chapter shows that the whole knowing process displayed by intelligence is to be understood as a complex movement of Erinnerung.

In the fifth chapter the author argues that recollection is relevant not only in the transition from being to essence in the *Science of Logic*, but also in the sections regarding the categories of relation and the genesis of the concept. According to the author, the deduction of the concept displays a logical memory that completes and fulfills the initial recollection of being by essence. Contrary to recollection, which determines the division between being and appearance by means of reflection, logical memory internalizes reflection within substance. As such, the concept is acknowledged as the permanent and objective movement of thought within itself. Focusing on the last sections of the Doctrine of Essence concerning the categories of causality, the author illustrates how the logical form of self-relation is established according to a mnemonic method.
The aim of the sixth chapter is to elucidate the methodological meaning of the concept of Erinnerung in Hegel’s philosophy of history. This chapter proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it provides the systematic features of Hegel’s concept of method. Secondly, it studies the Introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy of History in order to articulate the meaning of Erinnerung with respect to the structural moments of the exposition of world-history. Thirdly, it raises the question of how to understand the totality which Erinnerung is meant to express and argues for the conception of a historicity without historicism.

The seventh chapter discusses the role of Erinnerung in Hegel’s Aesthetics. More specifically, it examines its role in Hegel’s conception of the artistic genius and the dynamics governing artistic creativity. The analysis brings into light the tensions affecting the subjective moment of the artistic production due to the fact that such a moment is the center of both an internalizing and an exteriorizing movement. The genius is situated at the meeting point of centripetal forces—which attract what is external and inessential to the spiritual inwardness and shape the sensible, external material by providing it with a spiritual appearance—and centrifugal forces, which necessarily give his work an external reality and a place in a definite context, thereby offering it to its public.

The eighth chapter offers an extensive examination of the role of Erinnerung in the different works Hegel devoted to the philosophy of religion, including the early writings, the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Through this analysis, the chapter identifies two main views of recollection: the first, emerging from the early writings, regards it as a form of abstract subjectivism and therefore as a defective aspect of Protestantism. The second view, emerging from the later works, assigns to Erinnerung a high, speculative value.

The ninth chapter is devoted to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy and aims at illuminating Hegel’s conception of the history of philosophy through the examination of the concept of Erinnerung. In particular, this analysis enables one to clarify questions related to the distinction of the history of philosophy from a simple narration of opinions, and to the manner in which philosophy is connected to, and at the same time different from, other configurations of spirit. Although Hegel does not extensively employ the notion of Erinnerung in the text of the Lectures, the chapter shows that this notion can enable one to understand the different strands of Hegel’s argument in a unitary and consistent way.
3. Our Volume: Results

As already mentioned, the general framework of this project is the hypothesis of a unitary function of *Erinnerung* in Hegel’s system, along the lines of what recent scholarship has done in the last years about the concept of recognition. In our view, there is no such thing as a unitary narrow meaning of *Erinnerung*, corresponding to an individual dynamic of this concept within the system or to a conceptual device that can be found at work at different levels of the system. At the same time, the itinerary presented in this volume displays a certain conceptual continuity and unity: depending on the context one examines, *Erinnerung* mediates between the different forms of inwardness and exteriority, or subjectivity and objectivity, that are presented at different degrees of development according to the systematic place in which the movement of *Erinnerung* takes place. Such movement, as the essays in this volume show, is at work in the fundamental moments of Hegel’s system.

The studies we present here aim to contribute to the definition of a dynamic structure of the concept of *Erinnerung*, which acquires different specific configurations and concentrates in itself an entire range of dynamics that cannot be reduced to the psychological process of recollection. We believe that a clearer understanding of the different instances of the notion of *Erinnerung* is the necessary premise in order to grasp the fundamental meaning of *Erinnerung* at work throughout its different occurrences. In this sense, the operation we carry out in this volume seems necessary in order for further research to be conducted in the future without forcing its deep meaning to adapt to a partial or unilateral interpretation.

Starting from the pervasive character of this notion within Hegel’s thought, therefore, our aim is mainly to bring attention on *Erinnerung* as a central concept within Hegel’s system as a whole. Although *Erinnerung* can be assimilated neither to the whole dialectical process, nor to its outcome as such, the understanding of the kind of operation it carries out enables us to illuminate some of the most complex parts of Hegel’s philosophical system, since—as we hope to show—*Erinnerung* plays a crucial role in Hegel’s idea of philosophical science.